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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
sufficient prospect of liquidation to bring the interests of the directors into
conflict with those of the corporation and its creditors. Directors, then, occupying a position which puts it within their power to conceal the evidence of the
facts and to defy detection, should be given the burden of showing that, at
the time of their purchase, there was a well founded expectation of the
debtor's composition and solvency.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE
JUROR ON CROSS EXAMINATION

OF

Defendant was indicted for entering into a conspiracy or agreement that
he would vote falsely while doing jury duty.' On direct examination of another juror, testimony was admitted as to how defendant-juror had voted in
the jury room. Cross examination as to how other jurors had voted was declared improper because of the juror privilege. On appeal, held, that there was
no error in restricting the cross examination. Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d
960, rehearingdenied, 176 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1949).
It is a general rule that communications among jurors are privileged
against disclosure on the witness stand without their consent.2 The privilege
is based on the public policy that by assurance of secrecy in the jury room
there will be promoted freedom of discussion and deliberation so essential for
a proper determination by the jurors.3 However, there are exceptions to this
privilege. It does not apply where the relation in which it arose has been fraudulently commenced or continued, 4 nor where a juror has been guilty of misconduct with respect to some collateral matter.8
Sometimes the rule is confused with the competency of the witness to
testify in the impeachment of a verdict. 6 Where the situation involves the impeachment of a verdict, the courts generally have kept the juror's privilege inviolate.7 On the other hand, where the suit in which the juror had served ended
in a mistrial, the privilege as to impeachment of a verdict was held inappropriate and testimony by other jurors as to the defendant-juror's statements
was admitted.8 This represents a sharp divergence from privileges for confidential communications where testimony is excluded, except when waived or
offered voluntarily by the person asserting the privilege. 9 An extension allowed
1. 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 88 (1946).
2. 8 Wiramoo, EVIDENCE § 2346 (3d ed. 1940).

3. M'Kain v. Love, 2 Hill 506 (S.C. 1834).

4. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932), 81 U. oF PA. L. RFV. 1000 (1933).
5. In re Cochran, 237 N.Y. 336, 143 N.E. 212 (1924) (An attempt to corrupt vote).
6. See Clark v. United States, supra at 12, 13.
7. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1911) ; Kelly v. State, 39 Fla. 122, 22 So.
303 (1897). See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 268, 269 (1914). See 8 WIGMOR-, EvIDENcE
§ 2354 n.l (3d ed. 1940) (at least one exception to this in a dozen code states).
8. Clark v. United States, supra.
9. 8 WIGMOaR, EvIDENcE § 2354 (3d ed. 1940).

CASES NOTED
an accused juror, charged with perjury on a voir dire examination, to show by
cross examination of the other jurors how the panel voted.' 0 This is limited to
instances in which a mistrial occurred and the inqury concerned a crime committed prior to the jurors' retirement."
Inasmuch as the principal case is not one in which a member of the jury
claims the privilege of being protected against disclosure, the point is whether or
not the privilege of the other jurors should cease when supervened by the delendant-juror's right to reasonable latitude of cross-examination. Here the
juror had participated in a case which ended in a mistrial; furthermore, he
was charged with a crime committed before retiring to the jdry room. According to the above reasoning where these factors are present, the privilege should
end and cross-examination as to the other jurors' voting should be permitted.
The privilege has not proved invulnerable when it has come in conflict with a
paramount policy, such as the protection of the integrity of the jury. It should
not be upheld where it restricts the right to cross-examine; a fundamental right
12
of a defendant accused of a crime.

FEDERAL COU RTS-J URISDICTION-EXTENSION
OF THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
An action was brought in federal district court against the directors
of a New York corporation by shareholders therein, alleging misuse of corporate funds. At the time suit was instituted, an action based upon the same
claims brought against substantially the same defendants, but by different
shareholders, was pending in the state court. The federal court stayed further
proceedings pending the determination of the suit in the state court. An appeal
by petitioner to review the order staying proceedings was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals on the ground that such an order was not a "final order"
from which plaintiff could appeal.' Petitioner then requested a writ of
mandamus directing the district court judge to proceed with the trial of the
action. Held, petition denied; the right of access to a federal court is not
absolute and an action commenced in such court based upon diversity of
citizenship may, in the discretion of the trial court, be stayed, or not even
heard, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Mottolese v. Kaufman,
176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J. dissenting.)
Originally a citizen was allowed an absolute privilege of access to a
federal court, even though its exercise resulted in inconvenience, delay and
10. Serpas v. State, 188 La. 1074, 179 So. 1 (1938).
11. See note 9 supra.

12. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
1. Mottolese v. Preston, 172 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1949).

